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MICHAEL VINCENT MCGINNIS"

Collective Bads: The Case Of Low-

Level Radioactive Waste Compacts
ABSTRACT

In low-level radioactive waste (LLW) compact development, policy
gridlock and intergovernmental conflict between states has been the
norm. In additionto the not-in-my-backyard(NIMBY) phenomenon,
LLW compacts must contend with myriad political and ethical
dilemmas endemic to a particularcollective bad. This paper characterizes the epistemology of collective bads, and reviews how LLW

compacts deal with such bads. In addition, using data from survey
questionnaires and interviews, this paper assesses the cooperative
nature of LLW compacts in terms of their levels of regional autonomy, regional efficacy, allocation of costs and benefits, and their

technocentric orientation.
DILEMMAS IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Energy produced from a nuclear fission reactor constitutes a
Faustian bargain: In exchange for the technological prowess which has
enabled us to produce nuclear energy, we must deal with the wastes.
Nuclear waste is the "dirtiest" modem society has produced, for no
technology can secure, isolate, protect, neutralize and control the waste.
Although we attempt to separate wastes from our neighborhoods, many
people continue to interact with, and often reside in, communities
plagued by waste-related problems. Nuclear waste will remain a burden
to future human and non-human beings alike.'

In the United States, a majority of low-level radioactive waste
(LLW) comes from the 120 operating commercial nuclear power plants.2
* Co-Director, Center for Bioregional Studies and Conflict Resolution, 7602 Hollister
Avenue, Ste. 202, Goleta, CA 93117. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA (1993). The
author would like to thank Rich Weiner, Dean Mann, David Feldman, and Mary English for
their useful comments on earlier drafts. This material is based upon work supported by the
National Science Foundation under Award SES-9122122, and grants by the University of
California. Respondents surveyed and interviewed were guaranteed confidentiality. Any
opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science
Foundation or the University of California.
1. K. Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case Against Geological
Disposal of Nuclear Waste (1993).
2. M. English, Siting Low-Level Radioactive Waste Facilities 4 (1992).
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In 1990, plants in New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Illinois, South
Carolina, Oregon, California, Virginia, North Carolina and Alabama
accounted for about two-thirds of the approximately 1.1 million cubic feet
of LLW produced.- If not adequately contained, LLW will emit alpha,
beta, or gamma radiation. Each of these kinds of radiation poses a threat
to human and non-human beings, and can leak into underground
aquifers, contaminate other biophysical elements, or be carried by water
and wind.'
LLW is a particularly "hot potato" which the federal government
has passed to the states.6 In the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
(LLWPA), Congress delegated responsibility to states and interstate
compacts to find alternative LLW sites.7 LLW compacts are negotiated
contracts between two or more states which are ratified by Congress.8
The states, through the National Governors' Association, lobbied for the
passage of the LLWPA because they believed that the states were better
qualified than the federal government to protect citizens and the
environment. 9 Three principles were incorporated in the LLWPA: (1)
state responsibility for providing the LLW disposal capacity; (2)
encouragement of interstate compacts for the exercise of this responsibili-

3. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO RCED 92-61, Nuclear Waste: Slow Progress
Developing Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities 9 (1992).
4. Council of Scientific Affairs, Radioactive Waste, 26 JAMA 669 (Aug. 4, 1989).
5. Under national standards set by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 10 CFR
§ 61.1-.84 (1993), release of radioactivity must not exceed .25mSv (25 mrem) per person per
year. Id. at 61.41. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that people
living near a LLW disposal facility would be exposed to up to 10m rem per person a year.
D. Bartlett & J.Steele, in Forevermore: Nuclear Waste in America (1985) state that the NRC
acknowledged that the repository in Bamwell, S.C. has buried LLW which was emitting up
to 10,000 reins per hour (and a three minute exposure would be lethal to a human being).
See also R. Fuchs & Culbertson-Arendts, U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/LLW-132, 1990
State-by-State Assessment of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Received at Commercial Disposal
Sites (1991) for a report on the volumes and curie content of wastes shipped for storage by
type of waste generator and state of origin.
6. Low-level waste can be defined as all radioactive wastes not classified as high-level
radioactive waste, transuranic waste or by-product materials as defined in 42 U.S.C. §
2014(e)(2) (1988) or waste classified by the NRC as LLW. LLW varies in composition from
rags and contaminated paper and tools to waste treatment materials, filters, sludges, ion
exchange resins, and used components from reactor plant systems. Office of Technological
Assessment, OTA-0-426, Partnership Under Pressure: Managing Commercial Low-Level
Radioactive Waste (1989).
7. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347,
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(2)(b).
9. Office of Technological Assessment, supra note 6, at 29. See also H. Brown, Low-Level
Waste Handbook: A User's Guide to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 (1986) and C. Bullard, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Regaining Public Confidence,
20 Energy Pol'y 713 (1992).
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ty; and (3) the right of any compact to prohibit disposal at their facilities
of LLW generated in states not belonging to the compact." The LLWPA
set forth a series of milestones, incentives and penalties related to the
development of new LLW sites."
The federal government believed that LLW can best be managed
on a regional basis. 2 Despite the ambitious but unclear goals of the
LLWPA, states have yet to form regional compacts and resolve myriad
dilemmas associated with the collective bad represented by LLW. 13 The
principal cause of siting failures is the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY)
phenomenon." This paper offers a supplemental explanation for siting
failures, and reviews the cooperative nature of LLW compacts in terms
of their levels of regional autonomy and regional efficacy, allocation of
costs and benefits, and technocentric orientation.
The Epistemology of Collective Bads
LLW lies in the domain of "transcience" which, as one scholar
notes, "inevitably involves the intermingling of facts and values."" In
LLW siting, technical and scientific issues are not value-free, but are rife
with disputes rooted in different epistemic values. Proposed solutions are
predicated on how one defines the problem and the particular values
policy makers and others bring to decision-making. Scientific understanding and political consensus are hampered by the lack of control and
objectivity, and perceptions of technological and health risks. 16 There is
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (1988). See also D. Condon, The Never Ending Story. LowLevel
Waste and the Exclusionary Authority of Noncompacting States, 30 Nat. Res. J.65, 65-86 (1990).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(1). For a description of the regional plan set up by the Federal
Government, see .White & J.Spath, Low-level Radioactive Waste: How Are States Setting Their
Sites?, 26 Env't 16 (1984); Condon, supra note 10, at 69.
13. R. Kearney, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management: Environmental Policy, Federalism,
and New York, 23 Publius 57 (1993).
14. NIMBY is a multifaceted syndrome and depends on several key factors: the nature
of participation afforded to the public, the public's knowledge of nuclear waste problems
and alternative solutions, the public's perception of the credibility and competence of
government, and the public's assessment of the technical data on site characteristics and
impacts. M. Kraft & B. Clary, Citizen Participation and the NIMBY Syndrome: Public Response
to Radioactive Waste Disposal The W. Pol. Sci. Q. 299, 324 (June 1991). In addition to the
NIMBY phenomenon, English shows that'there are other issues compacts must contend
with: LLW definitions, regulatory and disposal responsibilities, exposure standards, volume
and source reduction, fee structures, and liability concerns. Supra note 2, at 17.
15. English, supra note 2, at 97.
16. As English suggests, "Cultural contexts and the values they inculcate help to shape
answers to such fundamental questions as... How bad is it? Can and will it be managed?
And because these answers inevitably will differ, especially across cultures (including
organizational cultures), efforts at risk communication that strive to... attain a consensus
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no "fail-safe" technological fix or scientific solution to siting or disposal
of LLW. 17 For example, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) notes that we cannot rely on institutional or technological
safeguards to contain nuclear waste beyond 100 years.1 8 There is no
guarantee that technological enhancements will increase public acceptance
of a site or confidence in administrators and government to deal with
LLW issues. Even the experts disagree on the ability of science and
technology to resolve siting dilemmas." Uncertainty and ambivalence
on the part of administrators has been dealt with through greater
emphasis on probabilistic risk assessments. The political and technological
complexities of siting for LLW precludes a reductionist approach to LLW
management. Although surprise-free forecasts and benefit-cost analysis
are necessary in LLW siting, they are insufficient decisionmaking
methods because they leave us unprepared to interpret improbable
eventualities and uncertainties rooted in a particular collective bad. To
cause the minimum adverse impact on diverse ecosystems and human
communities, we need LLW policies that can be revisited. Ideally, an
iterative policy-making design is essential for responsible and effective
containment of LLW. 2°
It is appropriate to think of LLW as a collective bad.2" Collective
bads have the following general characteristics: (1)one cannot understand
collective bads without understanding the context in sufficient detail; (2)
policy makers justify decisions as either good or bad; (3) there are few
opportunities to find solutions by trial and error; (4) collective bads are
symptomatic of other collective bads; (5) collective bads transcend
political boundaries and are thus transboundary; and, (6) collective bads
foster a high level of public fear and mistrust.' With respect to collec-

on risk are doomed to be at best limited success." Id. at 112.
17. Id. at 97.
18. D. Hawkins, Considerations of Environmental Protection Criteria for Radioactive
Waste 27-29 (1978).
19. J.Flynn & P. Slovic, Nuclear Wastes 'and Public Trust, 8 Forum 92-100 (1993).
20. D. Ludwig et al. argue that an iterative design is necessary to deal with biological and
physical uncertainties in Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation, and Conservation: Lessons from
History, 260 Sci. 17, 36 (1993).
21. "Collective bad" is a term derived from M. Crenson, The Private Stake in Public Goods:
Overcoming the Illogic of Collective Action, 20 Pol'y Sci. 259-276 (1987). In his analysis of
collective bads, Crenson is theoretically concerned with collective actions dealing with the
"lesser evil" of ordinary neighborhood trash. Nuclear waste, in contrast, presents an entirely
different scenario due to the much higher level of potential risk and public fear.
22. M. McGinnis, TechnocentricDelusions and Problemsin Siting Low-Level Radioactive Waste,
Bioregionalism: Reconciling Nature and Public Life (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of California).
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tive bads, the public generally considers science and technology to be the
source of risk rather than the solution.'
Problems at commercial LLW facilities in West Valley, New York
and Sheffield, Illinois have fostered public distrust, fear and dread.24 In
a survey conducted by the author of key participants involved in compact
decisionmaking, 42 percent of the respondents "strongly agreed" with the
statement "Public fear and mistrust is a major impediment to interstate
cooperation". As Table 1 shows, 67 percent of the survey respondents
"strongly agreed" with the statement "Risks are perceived by the public
to be high".
In light of such fears, most compacts include "free-riders" who,
motivated by NIMBY, cooperate when it appears their LLW will be
stored elsewhere (i.e., outside of the state's political boundaries). In
general, when a state has been chosen as the designated host for LLW,
the negotiation process has stalled and/or the state has threatened to
withdraw from the compact. In light of the NIMBY syndrome, conflict
between compact participants is the norm.' Compact decisionmaking
takes place in a hostile environment.
One might expect the federal government to play a major role in
inducing or sustaining cooperation among conflicting states and LLW
compacts. However, as Table I depicts, 80 percent of the respondents did
not agree with the statement "The federal government acts as a mediator
to resolve conflict between compact participants". In the policy making
process, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department
of Energy (DOE) provide technical expertise and information, but they do
not serve as mediators. 26
Since the adoption of the LLWPA, some 42 states are members
of nine interstate compacts as depicted in Table 2.
Figure 1 shows that not all compacts have been organized on a
regional basis.

23. M. Douglas & A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical
and Environmental Dangers 10 (1982).
24. P. Slovik, Perceptions of Risk, 236 Sci. 280 (1987).
25. Non-compact states face several serious problems in addition to those that interstate
compacts face. Since a single state does not constitute a compact, the state might be required
to accept out-of-state wastes. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. In addition, states
that withdraw from compacts have the same administrative, operational, and political needs
of interstate compacts. They do not escape these requirements for issue resolution when
embarking on a independent siting program.
26. Low Level Radioactive Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021g(a).
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Table 1
Frequency Distributions for LLW Compacts on Public Fears, Risks, and
Cooperation
a. Public fear and mistrust is a major impediment to interstate cooperation
between participants.
Strongly

Strongly

Agree

Disagree

1
31
42%

2
20
27%

3
10
14%

4
9
12%

5
4
5%

Total
74

Mean = 2.12
Std Dev = 1.06
b. Risks are perceived by the public to be high.
Strongly
Agree
1
51
67%

2
17
22%

3
5
7%

4
2
3%

Strongly
Disagree
5
1
1%

Total
76

Mean = 1.49
Std Dev = 1.11
c. Publicfears related to the regional issues addressed by the interstate compact
are:
N
%
Extremely high
High
Moderate
Low
Extremely Low
Total
Mean - 1.98
Std dev = .97

24
26
14
3
0
67

36%
39%
21%
4%
0%
100%
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d. Conflict between participantsin the interstate com act is inevitable given the
natureof the issues with which the compact has to deal with.
Strongly
Agree
1
12
16%

Strongly
Disagree
2
33
43%

3
15
20%

4
9
12%

5
5
7%

Total
76

Mean = 2.40
Std Dev = 1.19
e. The federal government often acts as a mediator to resolve conflict between
regional council participants.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Total
5
4
3
2
1
69
27
28
11
3
0
39%
41%
16%
4%
0%
Mean = 4.10
Std Dev = .96
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Table 2
LLW Compact Groupings
Compact

Members

Central States

Arkansas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, Kansas.

Central Midwest

*Illinois, Kentucky.

Southwest

*California, Arizona, North Dakota,
South Dakota.

Midwest

Wisconsin, Indiana, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri.

Southeast

Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee,
*North Carolina, *South Carolina,
Mississippi, Virginia.

Northwest

Idaho, **Washington, Montana, Hawaii,
Oregon, Alaska, Utah.
Colorado, **Nevada, New Mexico,

Rocky Mountain

*Nebraska,

* 0 h i o,

Wyoming.

Appalachian

*Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
West Virginia.

Northeast

*Connecticut, *New Jersey.

Independent

Texas; New York, Massachusetts.

Unaligned

Rhode Island, Vermont, New
Hampshire, Maine, Michigan.

* host

state
** sited state
Source: Office of State Programs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
August 1992.
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The problem remains as much a political problem as a technological one. Compacts have failed to secure protection against liability for
new repositories and overcome public sentiment regarding the risks of
LLW storage.' Moreover, compacts have failed to avoid challenges by
public action groups and those afflicted with NIMBY (NIMBies) against
new LLW sites.' Whether a state is a member of a compact or not, LLW
continues to generate a common set of ethical and political dilemmas.
Ethical Dilemmas
Two ethical dilemmas faced by states in their attempt to site LLW
facilities are the consent dilemma' and the intergenerational dilemma,' Kristin Shrader-Frechette describes a consent dilemma as follows:
The consent dilemma is that siting radwaste facilities and
employing waste management workers requires the consent of
those put at risk; yet those most able to give free, informed
consent are usually unwilling to do so, and those least able to
validly consent are often willing to give alleged consent.31
The issue of consent is grounded in problems associated with the
inequitable distribution of bads. Is it fair for a local community to receive
the crux of the costs and the collective bad while the region benefits?
Local communities which have lower incomes, no job security and lower
levels of education may be willing to accept and give "consent". The
incentive for a local community's citizens to accept uncertain health risks
is the hope of jobs and economic promise. Shrader-Frechette argues that
the exchange, wages for a risky job, is grounded in a coercive context
which jeopardizes legitimate, free, and informed consent.
LLW compacts have dealt with the issue of consent in many ways. To
foster free consent, compacts have established complex compensation
packages. In the northeast compact, for example, a compensation package
for the local community which accepts the waste includes: a percentage
of the facility's gross receipts, a mitigation agreement not to exceed
$150,000, a payment in lieu of taxes provision, and a property value
guarantee program. In the southwest compact, United States Ecology
hired a favorite local teacher as its liaison, bought $3,000 worth of science
books for the local high school district, and offered a scholarship to
graduating high school students. In addition, local citizens have been

27. English, supra note 2, at 22.
28. Kearney, supra note 13, at 68.
29. K. Shrader-Frechette, Ethical Dilemmas and Radioactive Waste: A Survey of the Issues, 13
EnvtL Ethics 327, 335-39 (1991).
30. R. Kasperson, Equity Issues in Radioactive Waste Management (1983).
31. Shrader-Frechette, supra note 29, at 335.
32. Id. at 335-36; English, supra note 2, at 132-39.
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included in compact commissions.33 Despite such selective incentives,
local communities have generally been "dissenting" voices in compact
siting processes. 3
Local citizens have responded unfavorably to the promise of jobs in
exchange for increased health risks. In general, the NIMBY phenomenon
has taken a toll on compact negotiations and led to local discontent. Local
citizens fear long-term costs to the community: decreased public safety,
decreased property value, and increased health risks. A market approach
to reconciling local opposition and NIMBY has not sufficed.'
Another ethical dilemma with ecological consequences is spawned by
the phrase "Out of site, out of mind." Geographically and geologically
"suitable" disposal sites are in areas that are isolated and undeveloped,
and have limited annual rain falls. However, permanent disposal of
nuclear wastes in such areas assumes complete knowledge and that
perpetual containment across generations can be achieved.' As ShraderFrechette states, "Complete isolation appears to preclude adequate
monitoring, and adequate monitoring appears to preclude isolation."37
LLW siting is predicated not only on the best available technology and
science but also on the institutional capacity to deal with the multitude
of values and perceived risks in a particular community, landscape and
place. In cases justifying permanent disposal of LLW, what is called
"good" science tends to be that which supports one's position.
An additional ethical dilemma associated with LLW is exporting the
risks to future generations. The estimated half-life of LLW ranges from
100 years upward. Few institutions, broadly defined, have lasted over one
hundred years. Roger Kasperson proposes that imposing the financial and
medical-related debts to future generations is ethically suspect.' In light
of the intergenerational nature of nuclear wastes, Alvin Weinberg
suggests that a "priesthood" or a "permanent cadre of experts" would be
required to guard the reactors and the waste to assure their safety over
time."' In fact, the Department of Energy (DOE) is seriously considering
the technological priesthood to deal with high-level radioactive wastes.'

33. This material was derived from interviews with compact members.
34. English, supra note 2, at 136.
35. E.g., K. Portney, Allaying the NIMBY Syndrome: The Potential for Compensation in
Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilitysiting, I Hazardous Waste 411 (1984); M. O'Hare, Not On
My Block You Don't: Facility Siting and Strategic Importance of Compensation, 25 Public Pol'y
407 (1977); and M. Elliot, Improving Community Acceptance of Hazardous Waste Facilities
Through Alternative System for Mitigating and ManagingRisk, 8 Hazardous Waste 397 (1984).
36. Shrader-Frechette maintains that permanent disposal of nuclear waste in a geological
suitable and isolated facility is ethically suspect because, for example, uncertainties about
the future performance of a radwaste repository. Supra note 1, at 182-212.
37. Shrader-Frechette, supra note 29, at 332.
38. Kasperson, supra note 30, at 17.
39. A. Weinberg, Technology and Ecology-Is There a Need for Confrontation?23 BioScience 41,
42 (1973).
40. Interview with Officials in the NRC Office of State Programs, Washington, D.C. and
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There are significant shortcomings associated with an emphasis on the
development of a "technological priesthood". There is no way to assure
that a social and political system will be stable for the duration of the
LLW's half life. Resolving such a LLW dilemma is predicated on the
technocentric belief that we can foresee the future and control future
events.4' The ethical and political obstacles to LLW siting have not been
legally 42or political resolved in amendments to the LLWPA or by the
courts.

The 1985 Amendment, the Take-Title Provision, and the Court
At the outset of Congress' enactment of the LLWPA, scholars and
practitioners maintained that the development of regional compacts
represented a promising solution to a serious national problem.' Such
optimism was premature. Unhappy with the states' progress in finding
alternative repository sites, Congress, in 1985, amended the LLWPA and
added "incentives" for states to join regional compacts (hereafter, the
LLWPAA)." Under the LLWPAA, the three sited states, Washington,
Nevada and South Carolina, could eventually collect a surcharge on LLW
from out of state.4' A sited state could also deny access to a non-sited
state that does not belong to its compact and that failed to meet certain
deadlines.* By 1992, surcharges and denial of access could be imposed
on any state that failed to develop a site, alone or in conjunction with
other states.47 In addition, the amendment's take-title provision (TTP)
mandated that beginning in 1996 such states would assume legal liability
for wastes generated within their political boundaries.'

with Officials at DOE, Department of Environmental Management, Washington, D.C. (Aug.
26, 1992) (the officials requested anonymity).
41. 'Technocentrism" is a term found in T. O'Riordan, Environmentalism 11-17 (1978) to
describe an environmental world view oriented towards control of nature, a distinction
between fact and value in decisionmaking, and an administrative approach based on
suspicion of public participation.
42. Congress, in its amendment to the LLWPA, recognized the need to clarify the
relationship between the interim storage of LLW, especially storage at reactor sites, and
permanent LLW disposal. The goal in the UP was to force "the disposal of all such waste
generated within such State or compact region". 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
43. E.g., R. Kearney, Radioactive Waste Compacts: States Move Ahead, in, State Government:
CQ's Guide to Current Issues and Activities 1988-1989 232 (T. Beyle ed., 1988); R. Riggs,
Radioactive Waste Compactsfor the Northeast States, 63 J. State Gov't 80 (July/Sept. 1990).
44. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, Pub. L No. 99-240, Title 1, §
102, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-202lj (1988).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1),(f)(l).
46. Id. § 2021e(f)(1). See also Dart, Radioactive Waste Disposal Diluted, S.F. Chronicle, June
20, 1992, at Al.
-47. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(1), (0(1).
48. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(ii).
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Part of Congress's purpose in the LLWPAA was to set clear
milestones and penalties to encourage compact membership. Several
states without LLW facilities charged that the TTP placed the burden of
finding new LLW sites on the states rather than on the power industry
and its shareholders.' In 1990, the State of New York filed suit in
federal district court challenging three provisions of the LLWPAA, a
financial-incentive provision, denial-of-access provision, and the TTP.°
After both district court and the Court of Appeals upheld all three
provisions,5' the State filed a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. The Court upheld the financial-incentive and denial-ofaccess provisions, and, by a 6-3 vote, struck down the TTP,holding that
the TTP violated the Tenth Amendment.52 justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, argued that the TTP was not merely a congressional
incentive, but "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from
coercion."The perceived implications of New York v. U.S. are mixed.
Participants in the LLW Forum (a group made up of key bureaucrats and
industry representatives) have varying views. Members from Connecticut
and Maine, for instance, believe that a national policy for LLW is
required. California's members feel that the Court's decision will have
little impact on the southwest compact administration. Several members
believe the responsibility will be passed to the waste generators (e.g.,
utility owners and shareholders), while others believe that the Court
decision applies only to non-compact states, like New York. Some states
are thinking about withdrawing from compacts and repealing existing
state laws regulating LLW siting and storage. Other members maintain
that states are "off the hook" and no longer responsible for siting LLW.'
Despite the fact that the Court decision eases the potential
liability of states, LLW compacts and unaffiliated states continue to face
problems in agreeing on alternative repositories.' As Richard Kearney
states:
New York provides fresh ammunition to NIMBies and other
opponents of LLW facility siting ...The tendency now may

be for hard pressed officials to dig in their heels and do

49. English, supra note 2, at 26.
50. New York v. United States, 757 F.Supp. 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
51. Id.; New York v. United States, 942 F.2d 114 (2nd Cir. 1991).
52. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2427-29 (1992).
53. Id. at 2428.
54. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Memo for Carlton Kammerer, Director Office
of State Programs, Policy Highlightsof Low-Level Waste Forum Meeting, July 22-24,1992 (Aug.

20, 1992).
55. Kearney, supra note 13, at 68-70.
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nothing, hoping that an agreeable host state will finally relieve
nonsited states of their radioactive waste, or that Congress will
intervene to force states with operating disposal facilities to
accept out-of-region LLW indefinitely.
Non-sited states will have to find alternative facilities or continue to
store wastes at reactor sites. Waste generators will be pressured to help
states develop sites.57 Non-sited states will continue to face political and
ethical dilemmas associated with the collective bad represented by LLW.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
In general, cooperation between compact participants and the
public is a pre-requisite for compact siting. The problems compacts face
are directly related to the issue of "regionalism" envisioned in the
LLWPAA. One analytical approach relevant to addressing the cooperative
capacity of compacts is found in Elinor Ostrom's Governing the Commons.s' Ostrom encourages the adoption of a model based on institutional-rational-choice (IRC) for policy analysis. She believes that collective
action is predicated on the actors' choices and beliefs, institutional rules,
and the environment relevant to the particular "decision situation". An
attempt to understand decision-making rests in understanding preferences and beliefs which are shaped by institutional rules and incentives.59
IRC is employed by Ostrom and others as a criteria to analyze selfgoverning organizations contending with "multiple-use" conflict over
"common pool resources", such as fisheries, groundwater basins, and
irrigation systems.' This model can also be used to evaluate arrangements dealing with collective bads.
Ostrom reviews how self-governing organizations made up of
competing users and stakeholders have successfully cooperated to achieve
"sustained use" over time. In her analysis, Ostrom asserts that individuals are rational and self-interested participants in a decisionmaking
situation which embodies institutional rules and community characteris-

56. Id. at 69.
57. L. Greenhouse, High Court Eases States' Obligation over Toxic Waste, N.Y. Times, June
20, 1992, at 1, 10; Schneider, Decision is Expected to Ease the Pressureon States, N.Y. Times,
June 20, 1992, at 10.
58. E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (1991).
59. Id. at ch. 2.
60. F. Martin, Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography (1989);
Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy (D. Bromley ed., 1992); S. Tang,
Institutional Arrangements and the Management of Common-Pool Resources, 51 Public Admin.
Rev. 42 (1991).
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tics.6' Individual choices are byproducts of preferences shaped by the
institutional design and rules, available resources, values placed on
outcomes, levels of available information, incentives and constraints
imposed by the decision-making situation, and demands made by various
interests outside of the organization.
Analytical Approach
With the above model in mind, this paper proposes an analytical
approach which builds on the earlier work of Martha Derthick, Between
State and Nation.62 In her analysis of regional arrangements in the United
States, Derthick found that two factors influence effective regional policymaking: (1) the amount of federal authority granted to the regional
arrangement; and (2) the openness of the decision-making process to the
public.' Building on Derthick's findings, the study on which this paper
is based concludes that strong cooperative behavior among LLW compact
participants is also a function of the following key variables: 1) the
amount of federal authority granted to the compact by Congress; 2) the
level of regional efficacy and trust between stakeholders; 3) the degree of
diffusion of costs and benefits; 4) and the extent to which there is an
allegiance to an ecocentric world view in administration.
Proposition 1: A High Level of Regional Authority Increases the
Probability of Interstate Cooperation
A regional compact requires regional authority. Cooperative
behavior is an increasing function of authority. Authority, in turn,
involves three potentially separate issues. First, authority is greater if the
participants in regional compacts can make a final decision that cannot
be appealed to another governmental level (e.g., the federal courts).
Second, authority increases if the regional compact has the power to
enforce its decisions. Third, authority increases if other actors are
required by law to acknowledge the decisions reached in regional
compacts, and these actors regard the decisions as binding.

61. L. Kiser & E. Ostrom, Three Worlds of Action: A MetatheoreticalSynthesis of Institutional
Approaches, in Strategies of Political Inquiry (E. Ostrom ed., 1982).
62. M. Derthick, Between State and Nation (1974).
63. Id. at 13.
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Proposition 2: A High Level of the Sense of Regional Efficacy Increases
the Probability of Interstate Cooperation
The recognition that the diverse stakeholders in a region are
interdependent on one another and live within a complex regional system
is imperative. In an analysis of why states join interstate compacts, David
Nice finds that interstate cooperation increases as the sense of interdependence increases. He defines interdependence as a function of geographic
proximity." Nice is primarily .interested in analyzing why states joined
compacts. Here, interdependence is defined as a sense of regional efficacy
between participants and a trust between compact members (as well as
between members and other participants) in the decision-making
situation. In the study, the sense of regional efficacy was measured by
adopting an index (similar to that found in public opinion research)
incorporating three different scales in a survey questionnaire. The
variables are: trust in one another; sense of interdependence and shared
fate; and perceived ability to work together.
Proposition 3: The Diffusion of Costs and Benefits Increases the
Probability of Interstate Cooperation
Regionalism requires the fair and equitable distribution of costs
and allocation of benefits within the region. Differing costs and benefits
arising from the substantive problems under consideration are likely to
have an adverse impact on regional compacts.' As previously noted,
siting decisions require consent on the part of those interests that are
burdened by the costs. In the study, the allocation of costs and benefits
were measured by analyzing documentary materials and public records.
Proposition 4: The Movement Away from an Allegiance to the Technocentric World View Increases the Probability of Interstate Cooperation
Technocentrism is a world view which shapes the relationship
between human beings and the natural world. Technocentrists admire the
power of technology and its ability to control events, rational action,
managerial efficiency, growth and progress.' In this study, several
technocentric indicators were considered: the view that science or
technology can solve problems, the view that nature has merely economic

64. D. Nice, State Participation in InterstateCompacts, 17 Publius 69, 77 (Spring 1987).
65. This is consistent with a wide range of work on bureaucracy, see, e.g., J. Wilson, The
Politicsof Regulation,in Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament 135-168 (J.McKie
ed., 1974).
66. O'Riordan, supra note 41, at 11.
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use, the view that ecological concerns can be controlled, the view that
natural values have no place in administration, and the view that human
beings should dominate nature. In the survey questionnaire, scales were
developed to reflect such technocentric preferences and values.
To assess the propositions, the author's study expands on
Ostrom's work on non-hierarchical supply of public goods. Ostrom notes
that the ideal research strategy would involve a combination of: a) data
from survey questionnaires; b) interviews taken from a sample of the
participants for the purpose of assessing preferences and beliefs; and c)
strategies and documentary sources, such as public hearings and minutes
to meetings that describe institutional arrangements and the decisionmaking situation. To evaluate the cooperative capacity of LLW compacts,
a survey questionnaire was distributed to a sample of key participants
involved in compact decision-making. From a list compiled by The Office
of State Programs of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 227 surveys
were sent out, and 90 were returned (representing a return rate of 39
percent). This data represents the most up-to-date material on participants
involved in compact decision-making. An analysis of the data in terms
of the above four propositions is depicted below.
LLW Compact Authority
The authority of any LLW compact rests on the acceptance of the
compact's decisions by all key participants and other affected interests.
Table 3 shows that survey respondents agreed that "The federal government has given the interstate compact enough authority to make the
necessary decisions" and that "The compact has the power to enforce"
decisions.
Two-thirds of the respondents (67 percent) believe compacts have
a significant amount of authority. However, a deeper analysis of the
factor of authority shows that the continued existence of compact
authority is at the sufferance of federal and state governments.
L. David Condon states that Congress "created strong incentives
for those regional compacts and states without disposal sites to locate,
license, and construct disposal facilities."67 The LLWPA implies that
states that do not join a compact may have to receive wastes from other
states.' If a state decides to "go-it-alone", that non-compact state,

67. Condon, supra note 10, at 71.
68. LLWPA provides that after 1993, congressionally ratified compacts can exclude the
importation of wastes from outside the compact, 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c), but the Act does not
mention whether non-compact states have the same exclusionary authority. See alsoCondon,
supra note 10, at 72 & n.38 for a pertinent discussion of the legislative history behind the
LLWPA.
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Table 3
Frequency Distributions for LLW Compacts on Regional Autonomy
a. The federal government has given the interstate compact enough authorityto
make the necessary decisions.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Total
4
5
2
3
1
2
67
6
27
9
23
9%
3%
40%
13%
34%
Mean = 2.21
Std Dev = .74
b. The interstatecompact has the power to enforce decisions.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
5
Total
4
2
3
1
64
7
0
25
16
16
0%
25%
11%
25%
39%
Mean = 2.22
Std Dev = .84
c. Generally speaking, how much authority do you believe your compact has in
decision making?
N
%
Extreme Amount of Authority
A Significant Amount of Authority
A Moderate Level of Authority
No Authority
Total
Mean = 1.98
Std dev = .97

8
40
22
1
71

11%
56%
32%
1%
100%
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according to Condon "is not likely to be able to [legally) prohibit the
importation of out-of-state low-level waste."' The authority to keep
non-compact state wastes out of a future compact repository was upheld
by the Court in New York v. U.S. 7 Nevertheless, the Court did not
review the constitutionality of the LLWPA's "emergency access"
provision. That provision allows the NRC to grant emergency access to
a repository because of "an immediate and serious threat to the public
health and safety or the common defense and security" needs of the
United States. 1 Opponents of nuclear energy have raised the specter of
"emergency access" to mobilize local communities and environmental
groups against proposed sites.
A proposed site near Ward Valley, California that was agreed on
by southwest compact members provides an example of such opposition.
The proposed 70-acre, $40 million Ward Valley site is located some 24
miles west of Needles (13 miles west of the Colorado River) in the
Mojave Desert.' The repository's proposed 30 year life would be
developed, operated, and monitored by United States Ecology. The
terms of the compact call for Arizona, the other significant LLW
generator besides California, to develop a site that would succeed the
Ward Valley site. California, the dominant member of the compact, has
a stake in developing a repository because the amount of the LLW
produced by its nuclear power plants is significant, and because it has no
repository.' Environmentalists who organized a coalition called "Don't
Waste California ' are concerned that the proposed Ward Valley site
would become the next national repository, and that non-compact states
could begin to use the repository. 6 Eighteen non-compact states
(Washington, DC., northeast compact, midwest compact, Vermont,

69. Condon, supra note 10, at 85.
70. Ne York, 112 S.Ct. at 2427.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2021f(a). The NkC Chairman in a letter dated August 2, 1991 emphasized
that the NRC remains opposed to the implementation of the "emergency access provision"
as an alternative to meeting milestones in the LLWPA.
72. L. Stammer, Halt Sought in Licensing Nuclear Dump, L.A. Times, June 26,1991, at A25.
73. Minutes of the January 16, 1991 Meeting of the southwestern low-level Radioactive
Waste Commission, Sacramento, Cal. (dated Sept. 6, 1991)
74. Office of State Programs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Status of States Providing
Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste 49-53 (Oct. 11, 1991).
75. "Don't Waste California" is part of the national network, "Don't Waste US" based in
Washington, D.C., which is attempting to block disposal of wastes in other states
nationwide. Don't Waste US is focusing its attention on the California proposed site. S.
Hubler, Only California is on Trackfor Nuclear Dump, L.A. Times, Apr. 20, 1991, at A16.
76. Some of the groups opposed to the Ward Valley site are: Abalone Alliance, Alliance
for Survival, Chemehuevi Tribe, Clean Water Action, Earth Island Institute, Greenpeace,
Grey Panthers, Mojave Tribe, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Sane/freeze, Sierra Club,
So. Cal. Federation of Scientists, and the Western States Legal Foundation.
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Massachusetts, New York, Texas, Maine) which have not been able to
find disposal sites have expressed interest in using the repository.
Eventually, the compact commission formally denied access by noncompact states to the proposed Ward Valley site. The compact sent letters
to all non-member states notifying them that the site is to be used only
by the compact members. However, California continues to face problems
in developing the proposed site.7
The Lack of Regional Efficacy
As depicted in Table 4, survey respondents agreed that "It is
important that participants in the interstate compact stick together
because they share the same problems" and "share the same fate".
Despite the apparent belief in the importance of "regional
efficacy" expressed by key participants, compacts have not developed
around geographically suitable sites.' In Big brother/little brother
compacts, large waste producing states, like California, have formed
compacts with smaller states, such as North Dakota and South Dakota,
to handle their own wastes and keep other states' LLW out.' Other
"mini-compacts" or bi-state agreements have evolved.' The politics of
the formation of LLW compacts and non-compacts is the key to understanding why regional forms have yet to develop. As English suggests:
In selecting a host state or host community for a LLW disposal
facility, all sides tend to focus on the people that now live in
the state or the community, with the state and the community
defined by political boundaries!'
If one cotisiders the complex concerns associated with transporting
nuclear waste across state boundaries, regional efficacy is imperative. A
compact which is not contiguous will find that transportation of
hazardous material across states outside the compact a problem.' Most
compacts and go-it-alone states, as one survey participant notes, "do not
fit the conceptual mold ... and we are establishing a system which will
eventually collapse as a result of the financial diseconomics."

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

McGinnis, supra note 22.
Condon, supra note 10, at 69-71.
English, supra note 2, at 128.
Id.
Id. at 140.
E.Gershey et al., Low-Level Radioactive Waste: From Cradle to Grave 121 (1992).
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Table 4
Frequency Distributions for LLW Compacts on Regional Efficacy
a. It is important that participants in the interstate compact stick together
because they share the same problems.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Total
5
4
3
2
1
21
29%

28
38%

20
27%

4
5%

0
0%

73

Mean = 2.09
Standard Deviation = 1.24
b. One significant reason the interstate members cooperate is because they face
the same problem and share the same fate.
Strongly
Agree
1
'21
31%

2

3

4

Strongly
Disagree
5

35
51%

6
9%

3
4%

3
4%

Mean = 2.00
Std dev = .85

Total
68
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Deciding who will pay
Overall, some eighteen sites have been proposed. From a fiscal
point of view, development of eighteen new waste repositories will prove
inefficient, too costly, and endanger ecological systems and public health.
One participant notes:
The regional compact strategy has failed thus far because, as
it currently stands, too many facilities are being planned. This
will have adverse economic and environmental impacts. Much
of the problem originates from a basic mistrust amongst the
states and the political fallout of having a facility in your
jurisdiction.
A number of states have adopted laws which prevent the construction of
new nuclear power plants until nuclear waste sites are found.'
Liability for potential leaks is an additional concern. For example,
United States Ecology, the contractor for the southwest compact, has an
insurance plan for $10 million, which will not cover potential contamination of the proposed Ward Valley site." Two of the four United States
Ecology LLW facilities, Illinois and New York, were closed "amid charges
that radioactive materials leaked into the ground water."'5 Sheffield,
Illinois is a Superfund site with cleanup costs estimated up to $60 million.
United States Ecology has agreed to pay $9 million.' Opponents of
nuclear energy argue that tax-payers may eventually be left with paying
the costs related to cleanups within their states. 7 Because of such
liability concerns, citizens and government officials have fought against
development of LLW facilities in their states.
Technocentric Myths
The problem of siting for LLW lies not only in the political and
ethical dilemmas associated with this particular collective bad, but also
in the world view which has shaped policy-making. Faith and allegiance
to the technocentric world view shows no sign of abating.' As depicted
in Table 5, 60 percent of the survey respondents agreed with the

83. J.Thurber, CongressionalOversight of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal:Yucca Mountain
and the DOE Weapons Clean-Up 8, Paper Presented at the American Political Science
Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 1991).
84. Hubler, supra note 75, at A17.
85. Id. at A16.
86. Id.
87. Personal communication with members of "Don't Waste California."
88. M. McGinnis, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compacts: Cases in the Illogic of Collective
Action?, in Problems and Prospects for Nuclear Waste Disposal Policy 31-45 (E. Herzik &
A. Mushkatel eds.,1993).
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Table 5
Frequency Distributions for LLW Compacts which show Technocentrism
a. Technology and science can offer solutions to environmental problems.
Strongly
Agree
1

2

3

4

Strongly
Disagree
5

24
34%

20
28%

11
15%

12
17%

4
6%

Total
71

Mean = 2.32
Std dev = 1.16
b. I have faith in bureaucratic expertise to solve environmental problems.
Strongly
Agree
1
15
22%

2
33
51%

3
17
25%

4
1
1%

Strongly
Disagree
5
1
1%

Total
67

Mean = 2.10
Std dev = .67
c. Citizen participationin compact decision making is important.
Strongly
Agree
1

2

3

4

Strongly
Disagree
5

43
56%

24
32%

6
8%

2
3%

1
1%

Mean = 1.61
Std dev = 1.05

Total
76
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statement "Technology and science offer solutions to environmental
problems" and 73 percent agreed with the statement "I have faith in
bureaucratic expertise to solve environmental problems".
Such an allegiance to technocentrism will not suffice to resolve
problems presented by collective bads. An allegiance to technocentrism
is an acceptance of the mythical characteristics endemic to the bureaucratic ideal. The acceptance of myth as untrue lx illusionary islx reflection
of the old metaphysical hierarchy that developed in tlx late seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries between the world of (true) Being and (mere)
appearance." This metaphysical distinction between what is accepted as
real and mere appearance has been challenged. Claude Levi-Strauss
identified an intermediate level between appearance and reality.' The
battle between appearance and an individual's perceptions of what is real
often contributes to the rise of myth. As the author of this paper has
stated in another work:
Since we have no non-mythological access to facts, that is,
no facts that come to us unfiltered by our wordviews, the
problem becomes a judicious choice of the best myth. But this
choice is, in environmental affairs, not simply a personal one.
It is a collective choice, because the myth we choose fixes the
bureaucracy that controls the myths that operationally control
our access to nature ... Our bureaucracies are the results of
our choices and they dictate what choices we can make.9
What we have accepted as real or fact may merely be the dominant myth
we have decided to live by. For the time being, it may appear to be real.
One such myth is the "myth of objectivity". Administration is
perceived by technocentrism as an apolitical process. Decisions are based
on facts, not values, and are made by specialists who are neutrally
competent and experts in the field.' There is no place for ethical

89. Hannah Arendt referred to this relationship as "the two world theory" in which one
world overshadows the other or one world exists beneath the surface of the other world.
The Life of the Mind 73 (1978). In such a metaphysical assumption, one world is the
superficial and merely an illusory while the other world is the essential and the more
relevant. See also, M. McGinnis, Myth, Nature and the BureaucraticExperience, 16 Envtl. Ethics
(Winter 1994).
90. C. Levi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning (1974).
91. McGinnis, supra note 89.
92. Martin Heidegger critically reviewed our acceptance of modern technology as
objective or neutral. In a provocative essay entitled, The Question Concerning Technology
4 (W. Lovitt trans., Torchbooks 1977) he wrote:
Every where we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we
passionately affirm or deny. But we are delivered over it in the worst
possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception
of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly
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consideration in administration according to the technocentric myth of
objectivity. Another myth is the "myth of control". In LLW compact
administration, there are significant barriers to control-primarily the
unknown and the uncertainty of nature (as exemplified by our inability
to predict earthquakes). There is a lack of predictive power in compact
decision-making. Technological and political uncertainties lead to a
decline in administrative control. Acceptance of such a technocentric
administrative experience relegates ethical concerns to the margins.
One should not put the blame on science and modem technology per
se. In LLW compact administration, technocentric myths of control and
objectivity are presented as solutions to political and ethical dilemmas
that are rooted in the "push" to find and operate LLW disposal facilities.
As Table 5 shows, survey respondents feel an open decision-making
approach is required to reconcile such fears and mistrust. Paradoxically,
these LLW compact administrators interviewed also blame the public and
political process for interrupting the siting process. As one participant
urges, "Eliminate politics from the process, and allow decisions to be
based on sound technical principles and reviewed by technical experts."
Despite the preference for openness in the political process, a dysfunctional allegiance to technocentrism predominates. One indication of the
technocentric bias in compact decisionmaking is the constant appealing
of decisions to the courts. LLW compacts have failed to address the
diverse values and preferences of the myriad participants involved in
siting alternative repositories.
SUMMARY
The desirability and feasibility of LLW compacts to handle
pressing concerns, related to the collective bad represented by LLW is
questionable. Without a sense of regional efficacy, LLW compacts have
not been able to fulfill the hopes of Congress. Without providing for an
equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of siting LLW repositories,
the LLWPAA does not serve as a model to emulate in future transboundary concerns." Compact and independent states could be cultivat-

blind to the essence of technology.
Heidegger argues that technology is a process of unfolding, and craft, similar to art.
Technology is therefore not an end in itself. Like modem technology, bureaucratic
administration may be something other than a means to an end, and it may blind us
(through mythical experience) to the real essence of the relationship between man and
nature.
Heidegger felt that the essential problem of domination and control rests in the
emancipation of humanity from nature and the inability to "let beings be". The inability to
"let beings be" (e.g., both human and non-human beings) increases as modern technological
domination and control increases. The domination of bureaucracy over nature is analogous
to the transformation of human beings into mere cogs in a machine.
93. Cershey et al., supra note 82, at 169-75.
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ing the multifaceted NIMBY syndrome as a justification for challenging
the federal LLWPAA. Some LLW compacts have attempted to satisfy
local interests by offering compensation and developing citizen advisory
committees, but NIMBY and the public fears have not successfully been
reconciled. The lack of action by LLW compacts may eventually lead back
to federal pre-emption of decisionmaking in regard to LLW siting. The
future of LLW compacts remains in doubt. The issue may again become
a federal responsibility. Meanwhile, the hope for a responsible national
policy for the containment of LLW continues to recede like a mirage in
the Arizona desert.

